














































ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
Necla Tschirgi
THE SECURITY-POLITICS-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS:
THE LESSONS OF STATE-BUILDING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
EUI Working Papers
RSCAS 2010/35
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
European Report on Development 
 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES 
EUROPEAN REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT 
The Security-Politics-Development Nexus: 
The Lessons of State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa 
NECLA TSCHIRGI
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/35 
 
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 





© 2010 Necla Tschirgi 
Printed in Italy, April 2010 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 







Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), directed by Stefano Bartolini since 
September 2006, is home to a large post-doctoral programme. Created in 1992, it aims to develop 
inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the 
process of integration and European society. 
The Centre hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc 
initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, 
reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the 
European Union.  
Details of this and the other research of the Centre can be found on:   
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:   
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
 
European Report on Development 
The European Report on Development (ERD) is a multiannual process, which is framed within the 
initiative “Mobilizing European Research for Development Policies“. The objective of this initiative is 
to enhance a European perspective on development issues in the international arena, on the basis of 
knowledge excellence, innovation and building of common ground between the European research 
community and policy-makers (Member States and Commission). Moreover, this initiative will 
improve the visibility of the EU at a global level, help shape the international agenda and feed the EU 
internal debate on development. 
The ERD Team Leader is Prof. Giorgia Giovannetti. The multidisciplinary team is based at the Robert 
Schuman Centre of the European University Institute and is interacting with a broad network of 
scholars, from both developed and developing countries. 
http://erd.eui.eu/ 
 
For further information: 
European Report on Development 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
European University Institute 
Via delle Fontanelle, 19 
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy 
Fax: + 39 055 4685 770 
E-mail: erdsec@eui.eu  
 
Abstract 
How can development policy support weak, dysfunctional or fragile states? What constitutes state 
fragility and what are the appropriate instruments for state-building? After reviewing two recent 
quantitative indexes (The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World and The Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance), this paper cautions against the current tendency to categorise a large number of 
countries as weak, fragile or failing states. Drawing upon country case studies on Namibia, Somalia 
and Guinea-Bissau, the paper argues that state-building is fundamentally a political process and 
external “state-builders” need to develop greater understanding of the internal dynamics of individual 
societies in order to provide appropriate support to address state fragility. Current strategies for state-
building are heavily weighted in favour of technical, institutional and formal arrangements. Moreover, 
since 9/11, the international state-building agenda has increasingly focused on state weakness as a 
challenge for international peace and security, rather than as an issue of national governance. As a 
result, many preferred policy prescriptions risk weakening the very states that they hope to strengthen. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, development actors have paid growing attention to the interlocking 
problems of poverty, intra-state conflicts, complex emergencies and human insecurity. There has been 
heightened appreciation of the interplay between security and development as the costs and 
consequences of violence, conflict and insecurity on development outcomes have become apparent. 
Conversely, there has been increasing understanding of the role of development processes and 
strategies play in generating insecurity and conflict. Importantly, the strong correlation between low 
levels of economic development and conflict has been convincingly established. The countries that are 
at the bottom of the human development index also tend to be the countries that face persistent 
violence, conflict and human security challenges. As a result, there is a strong trend towards 
introducing greater conflict-sensitivity to development policies, and greater search for integrated 
security and development policies. However, it is still not fully clear how development and security 
policies should be integrated in order to address entrenched socio-economic problems for conflict 
prevention as well as for post-conflict peace-building. 
The causal connections between security and development are difficult to establish, since they are 
intermediated through a country’s evolving social and political processes and institutions. Current 
research does not lead to definitive findings on the role of such factors as poverty, demographic 
pressures and environmental stress on conflict and insecurity.
1 These developmental “risk factors” do 
not provide a necessary or a sufficient explanation of why some countries are more resistant to 
violence than others, and how certain countries facing grave developmental pressures are able to 
maintain a relatively steady course, while others succumb to violence and conflict. The burgeoning 
literature on the security-development nexus, as well as on conflict prevention and peace-building, 
falls short of offering conclusive answers, and necessitates further examination of the sources of 
fragility and resilience. 
One particularly promising line of inquiry has been the growing interest in the role of the state and 
in the appropriate strategies to support state-building in developing countries. In the last few years, a 
large body of policy literature has developed on the so-called weak, fragile, failing, at-risk or failed 
states. While much of this literature is produced by policy analysts and practitioners, and often lacks 
strong theoretical or historical bearings, it has served to catapult the nature of the state to the forefront 
of policy debates. Given the theme of the forthcoming European Report on Overcoming Fragility in 
Africa – Forging a new European Approach, this paper examines the current research on state-
building in the light of the parallel literature on the security-development nexus. 
The paper argues that recent research on state-building provides important insights on the links 
between state capacities, and security and development outcomes. However, the paper also cautions 
against the current tendency to categorise a large number of countries as weak, fragile or failing states, 
and to promote state-building as part of the global development agenda. The renewed focus on state-
building not only blurs important differences among countries, but also leads to policy prescriptions 
that overlook the specificity of internal political processes within each state. State-building is 
fundamentally a political process, and external “state-builders” need to develop greater understanding 
of the internal dynamics of individual societies in order to be able to provide appropriate support to 
                                                      
*  Paper prepared for the Workshop on “Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration 
Mechanisms”, organised by the European Report of Development in Florence, Italy, 16-17 April 2009. I am grateful to 
Dr. Tobias Debiel for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The revised paper also incorporates several 
insightful comments at the Florence workshop on 16-17 April 2009. 
1   For a detailed examination of the links between security and development, see Necla Tschirgi, Michael S. Lund and 
Francesco Mancini, Security & Development: Searching for Critical Connections (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2010). Necla Tschirgi 
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address state fragility. However, the development assistance tool kit is particularly weak when it 
comes to dealing with domestic politics. Current strategies for statebuilding are heavily weighted in 
favour of technical, institutional and formal arrangements. Perhaps more ominously, since 9/11, the 
international state-building agenda has increasingly focused on state weakness as a challenge for 
international peace and security, rather than as an issue of national governance. As a result, many 
preferred policy prescriptions risk weakening the very states that they hope to strengthen. 
The rest of this paper is divided into four sections which are designed to move the discussion from 
the quantitative analysis of state performance across a large number of countries to an examination of 
the diverse trajectories of state formation in three African countries. The second section reviews the 
profile and patterns of “state weakness” in developing countries based upon a recently released 
quantitative index on state performance and state capacities. The third section examines a more 
extensive index of governance performance in sub-Saharan Africa with a view to identifying evolving 
trends. The fourth section presents insights from a forthcoming study on the politics of state formation 
in Somalia, Guinea-Bissau and Namibia. The final section offers concluding insights and draws out 
policy recommendations. It is hoped that the paper will contribute to a larger discussion about the 
appropriate strategies for addressing state fragility as well as the development and governance 
challenges in sub-Saharan Africa. 
2. State Weakness in the Developing Countries 
There are numerous conceptual efforts to define state weakness and state fragility.
2 These terms 
encompass a large number of countries with widely-varying conditions. Moreover, these countries 
pose different challenges to a wide range of actors, including their own populations, development 
agencies, NGOs, international organisations, as well as government agencies such as foreign and 
defence ministries. As the ERD background paper “Millennium Development Goals at Midpoint” 
points out, international actors employ multiple approaches to defining and responding to the complex 
development conditions in countries variably labelled as “weak and failing states”, “poor performers”, 
“low-income countries under stress”, “countries at risk of instability”, or “fragile states”.
3 Different 
entities may even use the same terminology to refer to a diverse group of states which might be poor 
performers or unresponsive aid recipients or conflict ridden or autocratic — each implying a different 
set of assumptions and policy implications. However, as will become apparent in the discussion that 
follows, the definitional issue is important.
4 
Despite the lack of consensus on a definition of state fragility, the universe of so-called weak or 
fragile states has now grown quite large. Various lists identify some 40-50 countries as weak, failing, 
or fragile states which share certain common characteristics in terms of their capacity and/or 
willingness to provide for the basic socio-economic and security needs of their citizens. Recently, 
there have been numerous efforts to produce quantitative measures or indexes that rank states 
according to concrete criteria and indicators. These indices serve to highlight the similarities, as well 
as the differences, between countries in terms of their viability as states. They also provide an 
interesting window into examining whether state-weakness is a dependent or an independent variable. 
                                                      
2   See, for example, Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff & Ramesh Thakur (eds), Making States Work: State Failure and 
the Crisis of Governance, (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2005); For a policy-oriented study, see Center on 
International Coooperation, Concepts and Dilemmas of Statebuilding in Fragile Situations (OECD, 2008). For a recent 
survey, see Literature Review on State-Building by Zoe Scott, May 2007. 
3   Francois Bourguignon, etal., “Millennium Development Goals at Midpoint: Where Do We Stand and Where Do We 
Need to Go?” (A paper prepared for the DG Development of the European Commission for the 2009 European Report on 
Development, October 2008) The paper provides a useful survey of the range of definitions used by different actors, 
which is included in Appendix 1. 
4   Participants at the Florence workshop in April strongly urged greater definitional clarity as part of the European Report 
on Development. Such an endeavour, however, falls outside the scope of this paper. The Security-Politics-Development Nexus: The Lessons of State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Are states weak because their key security-political-socio-economic indicators are negative, or are 
these indicators negative because the state is weak? Should policies aim to strengthen states as a way 
to improve their socio-economic and political-security performance, or should the strategy aim at 
improving a country’s socio-economic and political-security conditions to strengthen the state? These 
questions lie at the heart of the current interest in state-building. Accordingly, it is important to take a 
closer look at the methodology and findings of two different indexes to assess the extent to which they 
bring greater clarity to our understanding of the role of the state in developing countries and its 
implications for policy. 
The two indexes, The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World and the Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance, are quite different in nature. As their titles reveal, the former is global, while the 
latter is Africa-specific. Moreover, they approach the issue from somewhat different perspectives even 
though there is a considerable overlap in their methodology. The following section reviews The Index 
of State Weakness in the Developing World by Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick in order to identify 
the key features of state weakness across the world, and to examine how the relationship between the 
state and security/development outcomes is postulated. The next section does the same with the 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance. 
The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World is one of several similar efforts ranking 
states in comparative perspective in order to provide policy-makers with a tool to understand the 
unique dynamics and drivers of state performance. Other similar studies include the Failed States 
Index by the Fund for Peace and published annually in Foreign Policy magazine; the Center for Global 
Development’s 2004 report On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security; The State Fragility 
Index  at George Mason University; the Peace and Conflict ledger produced by the University of 
Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management.
5 In reviewing various 
quantitative indexes and differentiating among them, Rice and Patrick note that each index approaches 
the problem from a slightly different angle, and that each has certain limitations. Nonetheless, 
collectively, these efforts have served to highlight the multi-dimensional nature of the development 
and security problems facing a large number of countries, while, at the same time, identifying the most 
vulnerable states as the focus of concerted international attention. Ultimately, the expectation is that 
understanding certain patterns within and across states will enable policy-makers to develop more 
appropriate policy responses and to inform the allocation of scarce resources. Interestingly, although 
the various indexes use different terminologies and methodologies, there is a remarkable degree of 
overlap in their quantitative analysis and broad conclusions. 
The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World reviews 141 developing countries and ranks 
them upon the basis of performance. The study defines weak states as: 
“countries lacking the capacity and/or will to foster an environment conducive to sustainable and 
equitable growth; to establish and maintain legitimate, transparent and accountable political 
institutions; to secure their populations from violent conflict and to control their territory; and to 
meet the basic human needs of their population.” (p. 8) 
The definition seeks to capture government responsibilities which are considered core functions of 
statehood — at least in an ideal type of a state. However, this formulation is theoretically, as well as 
historically, not well-founded, since few states (be they developing or developed) come close to 
delivering on all four core functions. Nonetheless, the Index of State Weakness is not unique in taking 
such an inclusive view of state functions and applying them to all 141 developing countries at various 
stages of state formation.
6 
                                                      
5   For a mapping of the field and a good comparison of the various indexes, see Susan E. Rice & Stewart Patrick, Index of 
State Weakness in the Developing World, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008) p. 9. 
6   Much of the current policy debate takes place without reference to the rich body of academic literature on states. Social 
scientists — especially political scientists — have long had a strong interest in the nature of the state although academic 
research has gone through many distinct waves. Following decolonization, and building on the work of theorists like Necla Tschirgi 
4 
Corresponding to these core functions, the Index identifies four baskets, each with five indicators 
that are used as proxies for core aspects of state function, as outlined in the Table 1 below. 
Constrained by lack of data on a range of indicators such as crime rates, the study relies heavily on the 
data available from the World Bank, the IMF, and other established data-sets. Based upon their 
quantitative ratings on the 20 indicators across the four key baskets, the Index divides the 141 
developing countries into distinct quintiles in terms of each state’s capacity and/or will to deliver on 
the four core functions of a state. The countries falling into the bottom quintile are labelled as “failed 
states/critically weak states” and in the second lowest quintile as “weak states”. Meanwhile, the top 
three quintiles include a number of “states to watch”, based upon critical indicators. 
Table 1: The 20 Indicators and related data sources used within the 4 baskets
7 
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The Index reveals patterns of state weakness based upon a comparative quantitative ranking of states 
along the 20 socio-economic, security and political indicators above. The most important is, perhaps, 
the least surprising: there is “a strong positive relationship between countries’ scores on many 
individual indicators and their overall performance on the Index” (p. 10). The strong positive 
relationship does not hold with respect to four indicators: coups, inflation, GDP growth and inequality. 
However, one of the stronger relationships is between poverty and overall state weakness.  
“Thus, a substantial majority of the world’s failed and critically weak states are also the world’s 
poorest, with GNI per capita in the bottom quintile of developing nations. Conversely, none of the 
countries in the top performing quintile of developing countries have incomes that place them in 
the bottom two quintiles of GNI per capita.” (p. 10) 
This conclusion corresponds closely to other quantitative studies that show a strong correlation 
between low income and conflict. 
(Contd.)                                                                   
Weber and Marx, modernisation theory posited that newly-emerging states would follow in the footsteps of western 
states. With globalisation, the state was seen as retreating in the face of global markets. Subsequently, there were serious 
efforts “to bring the state back in”. Despite changing perspectives, as J.P. Nettl argued in The State as a Conceptual 
Variable, “the thing exists and no amount of conceptual restructuring can dissolve it”. (World Politics, 20, July 1968, 
p.559). 
7   Ibid., p. 9. The purpose of this section is not to examine the suitability of the indicators and/or data sources used in the 
study, but its main assumptions and conclusions. The Security-Politics-Development Nexus: The Lessons of State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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A second general observation is more puzzling, namely, “the weakest countries on the Index tend 
to be the least democratic” since the five selected indicators cited above do not necessarily measure 
democracy. Nonetheless, based upon these indicators, the following conclusion seems reasonable: 
“Most notably, developing countries that are more successful at political governance also tend to 
be better providers of social welfare. There is a similar, moderately strong relationship between 
political governance and the ability to ensure the security of citizen. Not surprisingly, the countries 
that perform better economically also tend to be better providers of social welfare. Though country 
performance in the economic and political baskets is not as strongly related, countries with high 
government effectiveness are generally also strong performers.” 
None of relationships are found to be “water-tight”, and there are significant exceptions. Nonetheless, 
the study goes on to argue that: 
“across the developing world as a whole, poor performance in maintaining security or providing 
social welfare tends to be associated with a lack of democratic governance, whereas stronger 
economic performance goes hand in hand with more adequate social welfare provision.” (p. 12) 
Indeed, the study finds the existence of relationships across the four baskets to be significant, leading 
to the conclusion that “state weakness is better conceived as a function of all four core areas of state 
responsibility, not just one or two spheres”. The only three failed states (Somalia, Afghanistan and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo) “register strikingly low overall weakness scores compared with the 
other states”. (p. 12) However, beyond the threshold for failed states, there are no clear-cut categories, 
which leads to authors to conclude that “state weakness varies along a rather smooth continuum”, and 
can be “characterized as a relative phenomenon that evades rigid categorization”. Nonetheless, they 
also argue that: 
“overall, the Index suggests that there are multiple typologies of weakness…. Many of the 
critically weak states exhibit across-the-board weakness in all four core sphere of state 
performance. Yet a minority of developing countries exhibit extremely low scores in just one or 
two areas.” (p.14) 
Interestingly, these range from insecurity and conflict (as in Algeria, Colombia, Russia, Sri Lanka and 
Indonesia) to social welfare (such as in Mozambique) and to political and social welfare (in Equatorial 
Guinea), all of which affect their overall rating. 
The study identifies the following features of the critically weak states: 
•  They cover most of sub-Saharan Africa, encompassing more than 480 million people; 
•  Out of 25, only five critically weak states are located outside sub-Saharan Africa (Iraq, Haiti, 
North Korea, Burma and Nepal); 
•  Extreme poverty is a predominant characteristic of critically weak states; nine out of ten of 
poorest countries in the world are critically weak states (with Malawi as the only exception); 
•  All but 4 of the 28 critically weak states are low-income countries (the exceptions being Iraq, the 
Republic of the Congo, Angola and Equatorial Guinea, which are all oil producers with uneven 
distribution of wealth); 
•  More than 85% of the critically weak states have experienced conflict in the past 15 years; 
•  The international community has intervened militarily in many failed and critically weak states, 
which tends to improve the scores of these countries artificially. 
As with “critically weak” states, “weak” states share common features: 
•  More than half of them (15 out of 28) are in Africa; 
•  Like the critically weak states, most of the 28 weak states are impoverished; 
•  21 out of 28 are low-income countries with a per capita GNI below $905; Necla Tschirgi 
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•  However, there are notable exceptions, in which some states under-perform (for example, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Columbia) and others over-perform (Gambia, Malawi and 
Tanzania) in relation to their levels of incomes; 
•  Weak states tend to exhibit more variable scores across all four areas of state functions than the 
critically weak states; some score poorly in one or more areas, while others demonstrate 
mediocre performance across the board; 
•  A number of weak states are plagued by insecurity (especially recent or ongoing conflict), which 
lowers their overall scores despite their above-average performance on other baskets. 
Like earlier quantitative studies on the security-development nexus, the above findings confirm 
several important correlations, but do not provide a consistent or causal explanation with regard to the 
relationship between the various factors that define state weakness. The Index’s four baskets and the 
twenty indicators roughly correspond to the socio-economic and political-security dimensions of a 
state’s functions. In measuring these indicators, the Index offers a quantitative analysis of how well a 
country is performing on the socio-economic and political-security front. In other words, the Index 
suggests that it is the state’s poor performance along these indicators that defines state weakness. This, 
however, is a circular argument, which equates the state with its performance. 
Yet, the state is also a political construct. What are its political attributes? Beyond the narrow 
economic and bureaucratic efficiency indicators, drawn largely from the World Bank data sets, what 
are the political indicators that capture state capacity and/or will? The Index inevitably leaves these 
questions unanswered. Instead, it equates statehood with the performance of basic security and 
development tasks. To the extent that it fails to deliver on these core functions, the state is 
characterised as weak. Thus, it is still not clear which comes first: an effective state to deliver higher 
levels of performance, or improved socio-economic, political and security conditions to enable a state 
to perform its core functions. As a general policy principle, should donors invest primarily in 
improving development and security conditions as a pre-requisite for more effective states, or should 
they invest in strengthening weak states to improve their performance across the four core areas? 
The study provides a series of policy recommendations which skirt around the issue. Instead, the 
authors argue for a package of responses including: 
•  poverty alleviation; 
•  the targeting of specific areas of weakness in individual countries; 
•  increased assistance to the weakest states; 
•  a special focus on sub-Saharan Africa; and 
•  multilateral approaches to building state capacity. 
In short, the Index  makes a strong case for taking weak states seriously by demonstrating their 
interlocking weaknesses across the socio-economic, political and security spectrum. However, it does 
not help to provide insights into the little black box of the state in the developing countries or how 
state capacities can, or should, be built. While no index can be expected to engage in the larger debates 
about what makes a state, the initial lack of definitional clarity about state weakness inevitably leads to 
an outcome in which resource-rich and previously stable Iraq is ranked much weaker than chronically 
poor and unstable Guinea-Bissau. This is, of course, an inevitable by-product of constructing an index 
that is based upon quantitative data at a particular point in time without reference to a country’s 
historical trajectory. However, as with other similar indexes, given the ambition of the Index of State 
Weakness to influence policy, their effort to provide a useful framework to rank and to classify fairly 
dissimilar cases into broad categories, such as “failed”, “critically weak” and “weak states” raises 
more problems than it solves. On the other hand, some of the broader patterns that the Index highlights 
allows for more in-depth examination of the similarities and differences among states both within and 
across the various categories. The Security-Politics-Development Nexus: The Lessons of State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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3. A closer look into state performance in Africa 
As the Index of State Weakness notes, 2 out of 3 failed states, 20 out of 25 critically weak states, and 
15 out of 28 weak states are in sub-Saharan African. This adds up to 37 out of 48 sub-Saharan states. 
With some variations, this is also confirmed by other similar indexes. While this finding is significant 
within the global context, it does not provide a sufficiently meaningful portrait of what is at play in 
sub-Saharan Africa, or how best to support weak states in the continent.
8 For this, it is useful to turn to 
the Ibrahim Index of African Governance produced at Harvard University’s School of Government. 
As the Ibrahim Index notes, in recent years, there have been numerous efforts to measure different 
aspects of governance performance. There are indexes to measure happiness, global peace, economic 
freedom, competition, corruption, political freedom, and many other index offerings. What 
distinguishes the Index of African Governance is its attempt to be comprehensive across a broad range 
of data for all 48 sub-Saharan African countries. Only the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators is as comprehensive. Other studies tend to focus upon limited aspects of governance, such 
as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the UNDP’s Human Development 
Report, and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report. However, the UN Economic Commission 
for Africa’s African Governance Report and the Afrobarometer surveys are more limited in its country 
coverage. 
Released in October 2008, the second annual Ibrahim Index encompasses all sub-Saharan countries 
and multiple dimensions of governance. However, its focus is on good governance, rather than on state 
weakness.
9 Nonetheless, its definition of good governance closely parallels the core functions of the 
state covered in the previous section. The Index defines good governance as the delivery of key 
“political goods whatever the culture and whatever else the government might undertake”. These are 
grouped into five categories, fourteen sub-categories, and fifty-seven sub-sub-categories or indicators. 
The five categories are: Security and Safety; Rule of Law and Corruption; Participation and Human 
Rights; Economic Opportunity; and Human Development. The study’s authors argue that their 
definition is comprehensive and common to all countries, and that the delivery of the core political 
goods can be measured by basic figures and statistics, such as those on poverty, infrastructure, the 
fairness of elections, the absence of war, etc. 
The fifty-seven variables or indicators used by the Index range from rates of crime, judicial 
independence and levels of corruption, to the quality of national elections and respect for human 
rights. These 57 assessments are aggregated into five overall measurement categories, weighted 
equally. The Ibrahim Index measures the differences, and then ranks each of sub-Saharan Africa's 
nations overall, according to the five over-arching categories, as well as each of the 57 sub-sub 
categories or indicators. 
Before turning to the findings from the Index of African Governance, it is important to underscore 
the variation in terminology used by the two Indexes despite the overlap between the basic categories 
that they employ. Does poor governance imply a weak state? Is a strong state a well-governed state? 
Are bad governance and weak states two sides of the same coin? How do they differ from other 
                                                      
8   This paper does not attempt to address the larger issue of the application of the European state system in the African 
continent with the creation of over 50 states. Nor does it address the appropriateness of the development models 
promoted by Africa’s former colonial rulers and current aid partners. These questions also merit special attention as part 
of the larger query about the preponderance of weak states in Africa. See, for example, Pierre Englebert, State Legitimacy 
and Development in Africa, (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), and Tobias Debiel & Birgit Pech, “State Formation and 
Persistent Hybridity in Africa: Reflections from a Development and Conflict Perspective”, in: Denisa Kostovicova & 
Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic (eds), Persistent State Weakness in the Global Age, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
forthcoming)  
9   See, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/the-index.asp. The first Ibrahim Index, named after its sponsor businessman 
Mo Ibrahim, was published in September 2007 and included data from 2000, 2002 and 2005. As in the previous case, this 
paper is primarily interested in the study’s assumptions and conclusions. Necla Tschirgi 
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similar categories, such as fragile or unstable states? The two indexes do not attempt to address these 
definitional questions — undoubtedly partly for political reasons. However, it is obvious that avoiding 
the issue generates its own problems — especially for policy-makers. Statehood implies de facto and 
de jure identity which has domestic, as well as international, ramifications, while good governance is 
primarily a domestic attribute. Thus, it is not surprising that, generally, external analysts and 
international actors tend to focus more on statehood, while local analysts and actors, shying away from 
sensitive political issues, are more concerned with governance. Inevitably, the differences in 
perspective have important implications for the policy recommendations that follow. Indeed, the Index 
of African Governance takes African states as given, and focuses on their domestic functions and 
performance as evidenced by the core functions and sub-categories of good governance cited below: 
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Unlike the Index of Weak States, the African Governance Index is not simply designed to classify 
African countries, but to track their performance over time and to rank them. The study’s approach is 
different from other similar indexes. While seeking to generate quantitative measures of governance, 
the study explicitly posits that: 
“objective standards of good governance may be reached in different ways in different countries. 
What matters is that some basic political goods are provided: there is no cookie cutter template for 
good government beyond solid performance.” 
For example, in public participation, which is one of five core political goods, according to the 
Ibrahim Index, “good government may naturally reflect variations in the specific objectives and 
traditions of its citizens in terms of its specific policy strategies”.
11 In other words, the study 
acknowledges that country heterogeneity with respect to their performance across the various core 
areas requires a more nuanced explanation based upon a complex combination of specific country 
characteristics and initial conditions.  
The authors recognise that their definition of governance “plows new ground”. They note that 
others often limit governance to rule of law and participation, and that their critics argue against using 
all five categories to measure governmental delivery of political goods, and to equate such delivery 
with governance. Indeed, methodologically, it is problematical to establish a causal relationship 
between the actions of a government and the Index’s outcome indicators, since the outcomes may be 
caused by other factors, such as underlying resource endowments, levels of wealth, ethnic 
heterogeneity, the actions of previous governments, etc. Nonetheless, the authors believe that citizens 
tend to measure governmental performance more broadly, and along the lines reflected in the Index 
                                                      
10   The Table does not include the sub-categories or the indicators and data sets since these are quite large. Instead, 
Appendix 2 provides a schematic outline. 
11   The Ibrahim Index provides a useful overview of other definitions of governance in the African context. It also offers a 
good explanation of its differences from other existing indexes which tend to be either limited in their geographic or 
thematic coverage. The Security-Politics-Development Nexus: The Lessons of State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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even though they recognise that government policy is not solely responsible for these outcomes. Thus, 
the Index is intended to correspond to citizens’ expectations that their governments provide security, 
rule of law, economic opportunities, educational opportunities, health care, and social safety nets 
while promoting political participation and respect for basic rights. These are, of course, high 
expectations - especially in states with limited capacities and/or political will. However, since the 
Ibrahim Index is designed to make governments more responsible to their citizens, the focus on 
measuring outputs serves to draw attention to the potential for government action despite other factors 
that might constrain effective outcomes. Indeed, the authors argue that measuring and comparing 
outcomes across countries can stimulate further examination of the range of factors that might be at 
work beyond government action. 
In this light, the results from the 2008 Ibrahim Index are quite encouraging. The Index shows that 
African governance is, in fact, getting better, with 34 out of 48 sub-Saharan African governments 
delivering improved results to their citizens. The top performers in the Index are countries that have 
been well-managed since achieving independence from colonial rule. They include Mauritius (with the 
highest score for the second year) followed by the Seychelles, Cape Verde, Botswana, South Africa, 
Namibia, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Senegal. Their populations are comparatively wealthy and 
have greater safety and security (except for South Africa). They are largely free of domestic conflict 
and enjoy the rule of law with moderate corruption. Gabon is the outlier in this group, with low scores 
for participation, but high scores for security. 
The African countries with internal conflicts constitute the bottom 10, with descending order: 
Nigeria, Guinea, Liberia, Eritrea, the Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic, Angola, Sudan, Chad, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. These are identified as countries that do not 
provide their citizens with security and safety, have low GDPs, poorly-maintained roads, insufficient 
health and educational opportunities, weak human rights records, massive corruption, and unfree 
elections. Liberia emerges as the most improved country in sub-Saharan Africa — having moved up in 
rank from 44th to 38th place with a new score of 48.7 (an increase of 10.4 points). 
The  Index  points to other important patterns. For example, a number of countries within the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) demonstrate strong performance, with five 
members of SADC ranking in the top ten and another seven members ranking in the top half. 14 
members of SADC have improved their scores compared to last year, with Zimbabwe the only SADC 
country to fall in both score and rank. 
Participation and Human Rights is the category with the largest improvements, with 29 countries 
demonstrating progress. Many of these have demonstrated improved participation in elections, which 
were considered free and fair by international observers. However, many issues still remain across the 
whole continent in this area - particularly with regard to women’s rights. In addition, between 2005 
and 2006, a majority of countries recorded improvements in the categories of Rule of Law, 
Transparency and Corruption; Human Development; and Sustainable Economic Opportunity. 
The Ibrahim Index is clearly an evolving tool that is designed to take into account the ongoing 
changes in the governance context in sub-Saharan Africa. Its goals are to provide a tool for both civil 
society and citizens to hold governments to account, to stimulate debate on governance by providing 
information about performance, and to provide a diagnostic framework to assess governance in sub-
Saharan Africa. In other words, the Index is intended to enable African governments to pinpoint the 
areas needing improvement, to allow donors to distribute their assistance funds to those sectors which 
need help the most, and to give investors a window into a nation’s strengths and weaknesses. 
Like the Index of State Weakness, however, the Ibrahim Index focuses on a government’s degree of 
performance rather than the pre-requisites of effective performance. Leaving aside the definitional 
issue of whether the focus is on “states” or “governance”, neither index comes any closer to exposing 
the sources of weakness, vulnerability or frailty among so many African states. Why, in other words, 
are so many African countries in serious trouble across such a wide range of socio-economic, political Necla Tschirgi 
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and security indicators? What accounts for their poor record in such high numbers both within the 
continent and in relation to other developing countries? What is the role of states and/or governments 
in their consistently poor performance? How does quantitative analysis translate into appropriate 
policy recommendations? 
4. Determinants of State Performance 
In line with the particular concerns of their respective sponsors, the two indexes covered above 
approach the role of the state and state performance from different angles. In fact, they use different 
terminology for what they are measuring: the first is concerned with state weakness primarily as an 
issue of international concern, while the second focuses on good governance mainly from the 
perspective of African countries and their populations. As quantitative tools that measure and compare 
the performance of a large number of countries, neither index is designed to provide an answer to the 
question of why some states perform better than others, or how state performance can be improved. 
While quantitative indexes can serve as important diagnostic tools by displaying particular risks as 
well as changing trends, they are not intended to go beyond a quantitative measure of governance/state 
performance. Yet, what accounts for a state’s performance is a critical question. Stepping back from 
the findings of the two quantitative indexes in the preceding sections, this section examines findings 
from three case studies on Somalia, Guinea-Bissau and Namibia. The purpose of this section is to 
extract some answers to this question based upon the diverse trajectories of these three countries on 
the spectrum of good governance and state weakness in sub-Saharan Africa. The discussion draws 
from a forthcoming multi-country comparative study entitled “The Security-Development Nexus: 
Searching for Critical Connections”,
12 and hopes to advance current policy discussions about how to 
address state performance and/or state weakness. 
4.1 Diverse Trajectories and Varied Achievements 
The three countries examined below are to be found at very different points on the two indexes. On the 
Index of State Weakness, their rankings are 1 (lowest — Somalia), 18 (Guinea-Bissau) and 82 
(Namibia) out of 141 states. On the Ibrahim Index, their rankings are 6 (highest - Namibia); 30 
(Guinea-Bissau) and 48 (Somalia) out of 48 states. In other words, between them they represent 
different gradations of governance-quality and/or state weakness. Having gained its independence in 
1960, Somalia is one of the oldest African states; today, it is the epitome of a failed state. Guinea-
Bissau became independent in 1974 and has consistently been wracked by political instability. Finally, 
Namibia is one of Africa’s youngest countries, having gained its independence only in 1990. 
However, it is also one of the most stable, enjoying a relatively high performance across various 
indicators, as shown above. These countries’ relative rankings are emblematic of the significant 
variations across countries in terms of their ability to provide the range of political, security and socio-
economic public goods covered by the two indexes discussed in this paper. Their diverse rankings also 
provide an opportunity to investigate the sources of their relative success and failure. 


















Somalia 38.8 8.2  6.4  26.0  15.2  18.9/48 
Guinea-
Bissau 
80.5 34.6  75.2  23.2  45.8  51.9/30 
Namibia 83.3 76.7  75.3  57.4  61.6  70.9/6 
                                                      
12   Tschirgi etal., The Security-Development Nexus. The Security-Politics-Development Nexus: The Lessons of State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa 
11 
As the above ratings confirm, Somalia has a dismal record across the five areas, while Namibia has a 
consistently high record across the same five areas. Guinea-Bissau’s record is mixed, with fairly poor 
showing in three out of the five areas. This accounts for their respective rankings on the Ibrahim 
Index. It also corresponds to qualitative assessments of their divergent trajectories as independent 
countries. 
After obtaining its independence in 1990, after a long armed struggle, Namibia is considered a 
relative development success despite its abysmal wealth and income inequality, its heavy reliance on 
primary commodities, its shortage of key natural resources, such as arable land and water, its ongoing 
struggles against poverty and disease, as well as the ongoing challenges of democratic transition and 
consolidation. Nonetheless, relative peace and security have been maintained in spite of the country’s 
involvement in two regional wars, an attempted secession by an armed rebel movement, border 
disputes with Botswana and South Africa, and an influx of refugees from Angola. Various factors 
have contributed to Namibia’s ability to address pressing domestic problems without conflict: the geo-
political transitions in Southern Africa with the end of the Cold War, the international community’s 
close involvement in Namibia’s independence struggle and peace process, generous donor assistance 
following independence, and increased Southern African regional co-operation following South 
Africa’s democratic transition. Today, overcoming its recent violent history, Namibia stands out as a 
“functioning state with sufficient extractive, coercive and symbolic capacity to incorporate all 
significant groupings and to suppress potential violent challenges to state and nation if and when they 
arise”.
13 
Somalia stands in sharp contrast to Namibia in its trajectory as a state.
14 Its economy and security 
deteriorated to the point of civil war and state collapse 30 years after its independence in 1960. 
Lacking a central state since 1990, the country has been ruled by shifting coalitions of clans, clerics, 
and businessmen. They have operated their own courts, security forces and locally-administered 
infrastructure and services. In the meantime, an urban-based private commercial economy has 
emerged out of the economic hubs under the control of particular clans and warlords. It has generated 
export diversification, small-scale manufacturing, roads, ports and other infrastructure, communication 
facilities, and health and social services, supplemented - where feasible - by humanitarian aid from 
international agencies and NGOs. In parallel with the privatisation of its economy, Somalia has also 
witnessed the “continuing devolution of warfare to lower and lower levels of clan lineage”. This 
fragmentation of power has created additional challenges to peacebuilding and state-building. The 
situation in Somalia currently remains extremely fluid and precarious following successive efforts by 
various groups (including the union of Islamic Courts and the Transitional Government) to establish 
and expand political control. In the meantime, insecurity has been exacerbated both by its growing 
exposure to terrorist activity as well as by the counter-terrorist strategies of the U.S. and Somalia’s 
regional allies. 
Guinea-Bissau provides a case study of the interlocking nature of chronic development problems, 
political instability and diminishing state capacities. The country’s problems have long been in the 
making. Following its independence in 1974, Guinea-Bissau made little progress towards development 
while it struggled with multiple coups and a short civil war in 1998-99. Already an extremely poor 
country, Guinea-Bissau was never able to recover from the devastation wrought by its civil war. 
However, more than the war, the country’s recurrent political instability hampered efforts to address 
chronic socio-economic problems, generated migration, urban food shortages, infra-structural 
inefficiencies and led to growing budget deficits and excessive debt which eventually paved the way 
for Guinea-Bissau’s current predicament. After thirty years as an independent state, it is still one of the 
world’s poorest countries and it is now facing the threat of narco-trafficking, the estimated proceeds of 
                                                      
13   The discussion on Namibia draws from “Namibia: A Success Story?” by Gretchen Bauer & Cristiaan Keulder. 
14   The discussion on Somalia draws from “Beyond the Conflict Trap in Somalia” by Ken Menkhaus. This chapter does not 
cover Somaliland.  Necla Tschirgi 
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which are estimated to exceed the country’s total GDP. As a result, Guinea-Bissau’s chronic problems 
have been exacerbated by the risk of state capture by criminal networks.
15 
4.2 Explaining Diversity 
What accounts for the sharp differences between these three African states? To what extent are states 
or governments responsible for the current situations of these countries in terms of the socio-economic 
and political-security goods covered in the quantitative indexes? The answers to these questions hold 
important clues for tailoring of differentiated policy responses to address their unique circumstances. 
Findings from the larger comparative study identify three sets of factors that merit attention in terms of 
their situations in comparative perspective. The first pertains to the initial conditions in each country at 
the time of its independence and its long-term ramifications. It includes such factors as physical 
endowments, demography and socio-cultural characteristics, including ethnicity. The second set of 
factors relates to the political and institutional characteristics of the new state while the third deals 
with external factors. A closer look at comparative findings from the three African countries covered 
in the larger study provides insights into the inter-connections between these factors and their impact 
on both state performance and state fragility. 
Not surprisingly, each country’s initial conditions helped to shape its future prospects in terms of 
both development and security. None of the three countries is landlocked, and each has temperate 
climates conducive to agriculture. Their natural resource bases vary, with Namibia owning rich 
diamond resources. All three countries have heterogeneous populations — divided by race, ethnicity 
or clan. They are predominantly rural and have low population densities. Namibia has a declining 
population growth due to the impact of HIV/AIDs. All three endured extended colonial rule and 
conflicts with neighbouring states. They all had armed conflicts with very different outcomes. 
However, these fall short of explaining the significant differences between them in socio-economic 
development and in security. 
Instead, the case studies point to another set of explanatory factors which relate to each country’s 
political arrangements and social institutions. All three countries are relatively new states, with 
Somalia and Namibia at two ends of the spectrum. Yet, more than longevity, each state’s initial 
formation and subsequent ability to consolidate and to expand its capacities and scope in order to be 
able to engage effectively with sub-state actors and dynamics appear to correlate closely with its level 
of stability, security and performance. Because political factors loom large in all cases, both their 
similarities and their differences deserve closer attention. From a comparative perspective, the three 
countries followed very different paths in their transition to self-rule. 
Following its long armed struggle, Namibia had a gradual, managed transition from colonial rule to 
democratisation, while Guinea-Bissau and Somalia had prolonged and incomplete state formation. 
Namibia, which was institutionally better prepared for self-rule, was able to conduct its domestic 
political competition through non-violent means, while beginning the difficult task of addressing post-
independence development and security challenges. Even before power was handed over to 
Namibians, there was agreement on the core features of the political system. Despite regular elections 
since 1989, Namibia has functioned as a single party state ruled by the nationalist movement SWAPO 
under Sam Nujoma. When the constitutional term of office of President Nujoma was due to expire, the 
ruling party amended the constitution in 1998 to allow him a third term of office. In retrospect, it is 
suggested that “this may have been a prudent move as presidential successions are often a crisis point 
in nascent democracies”.
16 When power was eventually transferred to Nujoma’s handpicked successor 
in March 2005, the handover was peaceful. With strong political control, the government was able to 
                                                      
15   The discussion draws from Anatomy of State Failure—The Case of Guinea-Bissau, by Joshua Forrest. 
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pursue a national development framework to address potentially volatile problems, such as widespread 
poverty, inequitable land distribution, and grave income inequalities without risking violent conflict. 
Somalia and Guinea-Bissau had different paths to independence than that of Namibia. Although it 
gained its independence almost three decades before Namibia, Somalia had to deal with the 
consequences of being divided between two colonial powers and unresolved political rule among local 
actors. British Somaliland (northern Somalia) differed from Italian colonial rule in the centre-south of 
the country. The British exercised indirect rule, which allowed traditional structures to survive, while 
the Italians largely displaced or corrupted traditional authorities. When Somalia achieved 
independence in 1960, its newly established multi-party system proved dysfunctional. Under Siad 
Barre, Somalia quickly degenerated into a police state and was not able to create a cohesive political 
system. Nonetheless, Somalia’s repressive regime was propped up by the patrons of the Cold War and 
by foreign aid. When the Cold War ended and foreign aid was frozen on human rights’ grounds, the 
Somalia state could not survive on its own. The continuing difficulty of establishing a centralised state 
in Somalia is largely due to the fact that, historically, Somalia has always been a mediated state. 
During the colonial and post-colonial periods, governments ceded authority over the judiciary and 
public sector to clan elders. Once the central authority of the state collapsed, it has proved difficult to 
re-create an effective mediated state. 
The Portuguese followed a crude mercantilist policy in Guinea-Bissau while exercising direct rule. 
Although colonial administration did not extend much beyond the towns, it generated nationalistic 
reaction and a protracted struggle for liberation. Despite national unity during the twelve-year anti-
colonial struggle, Guinea-Bissau’s post-independence history has been characterised by continuing 
political instability, multiple coup attempts, and a short civil war in 1998-99. Upon independence from 
Portugal, Guinea-Bissau was united under the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-
Bissau and Cape Verde) – a political outgrowth of the liberation movement. However, because the 
rules of the political game were not institutionalised, rivalries soon broke out between the ruling élite 
of the army and the PAIGC. These factional struggles have continued since then, alongside recurrent 
political violence and a tendency towards authoritarian centralisation of executive power. They help to 
explain the fragility of the post-independence state as well as the country’s inability to overcome its 
chronic poverty through sustained socio-economic policies. 
From a comparative perspective, the extent to which a country was prepared for self-rule under 
colonial administration, the nature of the inherited political institutions and the subsequent domestic 
political competition to achieve effective consolidation of central political authority emerge as 
powerful explanations for each state’s ability to manage its structural socio-economic problems and 
security threats.
17 In short, the experiences of Namibia, Somalia and Guinea-Bissau attest to the 
centrality of a country’s political regime (including leadership, formal and informal political 
institutions and constitutional arrangements) in terms of its ability to provide services across the range 
of public or “political” goods, including socio-economic development and security. 
The lessons from the three countries are in line with the extensive literature on the origins and 
nature of the African state and the subsequent crisis of governance in Africa.
18 It is generally agreed 
that the crisis of the African state can be traced to the legacies of colonial rule and the institutions 
imported by colonial powers, which distorted indigenous political culture and political institutions, and 
led to political regimes which were often propped up by external actors. Thus, there developed a 
serious disconnection between state viability and effective political authority in many independent 
states. Achieving an effective internal system for political rule proved particularly difficult in states in 
                                                      
17   These correspond roughly to the sources of “legitimacy” of post-colonial African states. As Englebert argues, a state is 
legitimate when its structures evolve endogenously to its society and there is continuity in its institutions. See, Pierre 
Englebert, State, Legitimacy and Development in Africa, (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 
18  A recent contribution to that literature is by Frances Deng titled Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Africa, 
(Washington DC: USIP, 2008). Necla Tschirgi 
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which the ruling governments relied on external support in the absence of an endogenous socio-
economic and political base or adequate financial resources. Ruling élites saw the state as a source of 
personal power and wealth. Cold War politics were primarily concerned with maintaining stability 
rather than providing support for state consolidation.
19 Internal coups, localised conflicts and recurrent 
crises merited international attention only to the extent that they threatened the regional or global 
balance of power. Thus, the Cold War significantly delayed Namibia’s independence due to its 
centrality to the balance of power in Southern Africa. Despite their long armed struggle, ultimately, 
Namibians had to await the end of the Cold War to achieve their independence. Even then, Namibia’s 
transition was a product of extensive negotiations among external actors, including the United 
Nations. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The above analysis has sought to go beyond the global phenomenon of state weakness in order to 
investigate its sources as well as its consequences on security and development outcomes, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa. While acknowledging the importance of the ongoing research on state fragility 
and the search for more effective strategies for international support to state-building, the paper’s main 
conclusion is the imperative to pay closer attention to the historical and context-specific dynamics of 
state-building. If state-building is to become an increasing goal of development assistance, 
development agencies have to develop more effective tools to monitor, assess and address state 
weakness, not simply as a development outcome, but as a pre-condition for the provision of security 
and development. Current approaches to state-building are not well-tailored to do so. 
Countries vary widely in terms of their state formation, political economy and institutional 
arrangements, which contribute directly to the quality of their governance. Thus, it is misleading and 
counter-productive to classify a diverse group of states as fragile and to buttress them through 
externally-designed policies and programmes. In this light, international assistance programmes such 
as constitution-building, accountability and transparency, rule of law and security sector reform 
(which are often provided as technocratic solutions to deeper political problems) need to be better 
tailored to individual country contexts, rather than follow standard templates. 
The cases of Namibia, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia provide interesting lessons for state-building. 
The international community played an important role in establishing the constitution and the 
founding institutions of Namibia. However, the end of regional and global rivalry with the demise of 
the Cold War allowed internal actors (and especially SWAPO) to institute effective political rule in 
order to begin addressing the country’s pressing socio-economic problems. In the case of both Guinea-
Bissau and Somalia, the role of international actors in engaging with domestic politics has, at best, 
been erratic and contradictory - vacillating between sporadic engagement and neglect. Both countries 
currently face profound political instability -.with Somalia continuing as a “collapsed state” and 
Guinea-Bissau as a “shadow state”. Until these societies are able to address their domestic political 
struggle and settle the question of effective political authority, they will continue to grapple with state 
failure both as a product and as a source of their dismal socio-economic and security conditions. It is 
increasingly evident that they need external non-partisan, neutral political support. However, the 
international community, and particularly aid agencies, is not well-placed to provide effective support 
for domestic peacemaking, as part of a strategy of conflict prevention or state collapse. Although 
external actors have come a long way in terms of synchronising their development, diplomacy and 
defence policies through 3-D or “whole of government approaches”, they face serious challenges in 
translating these policies into effective responses in specific country contexts. 
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Equally seriously, fragmented international efforts and continuing lack of common strategies by 
external actors, including the UN, member states, the international financial institutions and bilateral 
development agencies, often lead to duplicate, if not conflicting, responses. In order to address the 
interlocking problems of state weakness, internal conflict and the lack of progress in development, the 
international community has to strengthen its tools for playing a constructive and effective role in 
domestic “diplomacy”, which is different from than traditional “peacemaking”. It is worth recording 
that the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union have already begun to strengthen 
their capacities to serve as mediators in domestic conflicts and power struggles, as recently displayed 
in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Somalia. However, this is an area of international action that requires 
sustained and sizeable investment. The international community has traditionally invested heavily in 
elections in transitional states. It also provides extensive assistance for democracy promotion and 
institution-building, including through support to political parties, parliaments, and constitutions. As 
recent cases, such as Kenya, amply demonstrate, consolidating political rule is an ongoing process that 
requires continuing engagement, as well as effective tools and instruments, by a range of external 
actors based upon their comparative niche and capacity. The real question is not whether external 
actors should support state-building. Instead, the issue is what type of support is appropriate. As 
Englebert and Tull rightly point out: 
“Post-conflict state reconstruction has become a priority of donors in Africa. Yet, externally 
sponsored reconstruction efforts have met with limited achievements in the region. This is partly 
due to three flawed assumptions on which reconstruction efforts are predicated. The first is that 
Western state institutions can be transferred to Africa. The poor record of past external efforts to 
construct and reshape African political and economic institutions casts doubts on the overly 
ambitious objectives of failed state reconstruction. The second flawed assumption is the mistaken 
belief in a shared understanding by donors and African leaders of failure and reconstruction. 
Donors typically misread the nature of African politics. For local élites, reconstruction is the 
continuation of war and competition for resources by new means. Thus, their strategies are often 
inimical to the building of strong public institutions. The third flawed assumption is that donors 
are capable of rebuilding African states. Their ambitious goals are inconsistent with their financial, 
military, and symbolic means. Yet, African societies are capable of recovery, as Somaliland and 
Uganda illustrate. Encouraging indigenous state formation efforts and constructive bargaining 
between social forces and governments might prove a more fruitful approach for donors to the 
problem of Africa’s failed states.”
20 
In reality, international efforts to strengthen weak states and to support political stability in fragile 
contexts confront other serious challenges that are related to the broader international context. State-
building came to centre stage in international affairs only after 9/11. From departments of defence and 
foreign affairs to bilateral aid agencies, from the World Bank to the OECD-DAC, many institutions 
are examining ways of supporting state-building. However, the current policy focus on state-building 
is largely motivated by externally-driven security interests. It is important to note that OECD-DAC’s 
path-breaking 1997/2001 Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict does not make any reference to 
state-building. Although the document refers to “failed or collapsed states” or “states in crisis” and 
“crisis of state legitimacy”, these were specifically in the context of preventing or recovering from 
violent conflict. When the word “stabilisation” appears in the document, it is used to refer to economic 
or macro-economic stabilisation. The Guidelines repeatedly call for strengthening the state, engaging 
with the state, and co-operating with the state and national authorities. However, it does not call for 
state-building, or for stabilisation as a political or security agenda. 
The new focus came after 9/11. Just as Cold War imperatives led to strategies in support of regime 
stability at the expense of state consolidation, current state-building strategies risk buttressing states to 
serve as useful security allies irrespective of their domestic credentials or performance. The adoption 
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by the OECD-DAC of the Principles  for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & 
Situations in April 2007 represents an important policy development. The ten principles are intended 
to maximise the positive impact of international engagement in fragile states, while minimising 
unintentional harm. The principles explicitly recognise the links between political, security, and 
development objectives, and focus on state-building as an objective. However, as the OECD-DAC has 
noted: 
“The challenge for governments involved in fragile states is to establish clarity on and coherence 
in objectives. These objectives are likely to differ among the departments involved. For instance, 
the promotion of sustainable development is not the primary mandate of all government 
departments. Therefore, ministries may promote national interests rather than the interests of a 
partner country, which, from the perspective of development co-operation, is problematic. When 
dealing with the problems of precarious statehood – and in particular the wide range of potential 
threats emanating from them – the issue therefore is how governments determine their priorities 
for engagement in fragile states. From the perspective of the OECD-DAC, the question more 
specifically is where development outcomes should rank vis-à-vis trade, counter-terrorism, 
national defence and other political objectives of donor countries.”
21 
Thus, the state-building agenda faces multiple challenges, not the least of which is the prospect of 
rapid deterioration of materials conditions in developing countries due to the global financial crisis — 
possibly leading to political instability in hitherto relatively stable middle or low income countries 
which were not considered “states-at-risk” by earlier indexes. The latest Global Peace Index, which 
was released  on 1 June 2009, noted that rising fuel and food prices, followed by the dramatic 
economic slowdown in the global economy, contributed to making the world a “slightly less peaceful 
place”.
22 According to the Global Peace Index, economic troubles have dragged down the index 
performance of some previously high ranked countries, including Iceland and Ireland. In short, it 
appears that state fragility in its multiple aspects will continue to occupy policy-makers in the years to 
come. It is essential that more rigorous qualitative and quantitative analysis is generated to investigate 
the many dimensions of state fragility and to propose appropriate strategies for state-building. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of “fragile states” extracted from the European Report on Development 
background paper on “Millennium Development Goals at Midpoint” by Francois Bourguignon, et 
al. 
“1) Fragile, failed, or crisis states: these approaches are based on the assessment of a state’s 
strength around issues of capability, sovereignty and conflict. The USAID’s Fragile States Strategy is 
an example of this approach. 
2) Poor performing countries: by taking into account the quality of governance and policy choices, 
most of the international financial institutions (IFIs) focus their approach to difficult environments 
around how well a country performs in terms of developmental outcomes. The World Bank’s Low-
Income Countries Under Stress is the best-known of these initiatives. 
3) Difficult aid partners: in this approach, the emphasis is placed on the poor aid relationships 
between donors and recipient states, due to a combination of: 
a)  lack of political interest in poverty reduction; and 
b)  weak state and non-state institutional capacity to implement policy. 
The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and DFID have been pioneers of this 
approach. It is important to note that definitions and approaches inevitably depend on a variety of 
endogenous factors originating from the organizations who are trying to come up with them. These 
range from national interests, views on sovereignty and international jurisdiction and stances on 
impartiality through to effectiveness, institutional mandates and incentives, tools and practices and 
regional scope. Yet, the fact that the list of fragile states differs substantially at any one time from one 
agency to another (see the following paragraphs) suggests that subjectivity features significantly in 
appraising whether or not a state is “fragile”. 
Some formal definitions of fragile states: 
OECD-DAC 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee 
refers to a continuum of countries considered “difficult partnerships” due to a combination of: 
1.  lack of political interest in poverty reduction; and 
2.  weak state and non-state institutional capacity to implement policy. 
DFID 
Fragile states are those countries where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the 
majority of its people, including the poor. The most important state functions for poverty reduction are 
territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services 
and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest sustain themselves. DFID does not 
limit its definition of fragile states to those affected by conflict. 
USAID 
The US Aid Agency has recently come up with a “Fragile States Strategy” that offers three 
operationally relevant definitions for failing, failed and recovering states. This approach to assessing 
state fragility focuses on a state’s effectiveness (the degree of administrative capacity and resources) 
and legitimacy (the degree of perceived justice or fairness in the exercise of power), and relies on 
measuring four key dimensions: political, economic, social, and security. Necla Tschirgi 
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This approach provides a dynamic explanation for state crisis, and points to the need for linkages 
between integrated sector analyses (in a so-called “Fragility Framework”) and decision-making. 
However, the emphasis seems to be focused on security, conflict management and state capacity-
building. Additionally, integrating legitimacy into the assessment model, allows for inclusion and 
equity to be brought to the forefront of attempts to try and address causes and incentives. Nonetheless, 
a disadvantage of this approach lies with the fact that effectiveness does not seem to be sufficiently 
disaggregated to understand the difference between ability and willingness. 
The World Bank 
The World Bank’s LICUS initiative (Low-Income Countries Under Stress) defines fragile states as 
characterised by very weak policies, institutions and governance. Aid does not work well in these 
environments because governments lack the capacity or inclination to use finance effectively for 
poverty reduction. There are distinct degrees of severity within the LICUS initiative. The classification 
is based on the Bank’s own Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores. 
CPIA scores divide low-income countries into five performance-based categories, the lowest two 
of which are useful proxies for state fragility. They rate countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in 
four clusters: 
1.  Economic management; 
2.  Structural policies; 
3.  Policies for social inclusion and equity 
4.  Public sector management and institutions. 
These indicators are reported on by local World Bank staff, based on their own knowledge and 
understanding of the economic functioning of the country. There is a separate group of unranked 
countries, also deemed fragile. This provides a list totalling 46 fragile states, containing some 870 
million people or 14% of the world’s population. 
Fragile states according to World Bank Definitions (CPIA 2007): 
Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lao PDR, Liberia, 
Mauritania, Myanmar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uzbekistan, 
Zimbabwe, Territory of Kosovo 
Small states (less than 2 million population):  
Comoros, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Tonga, Vanuatu.” The Security-Politics-Development Nexus: The Lessons of State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Appendix 2: Indicators and indicator data extracted from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
2008 
Category I: Safety and Security 
Sub-Categories: 
1)  National Security 
2)  Public Safety 
Indicator Data: 
Government Involvement in Armed Conflicts; 
Number of Battle-Deaths in Armed Conflicts; 
Number of Civilian Deaths Due to One-Sided Violence; 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers Originating From each Country; 
Internally Displaced Persons; 
Ease of Access to Small Arms and Light Weapons; 
Level of Violent Crime. 
Category II: Rule of Law, Transparency, and Corruption 
Sub-Categories: 
3)  Ratification of Critical Legal Norms 
4)  Existence of Independent and Efficient Judicial Systems 
5)  Corruption 
Indicator Data: 
Ratification of Core International Human Rights Conventions; 
International Sanctions for Human Rights Violations; 
Property Rights; 
Judicial Independence Using Freedom House’s: 
“Rule of Law” Sub-Score; 
Efficiency of the Courts; 
Number of Days to Settle a Contract Dispute; 
Public Sector Corruption. 
Category III: Participation and Human Rights: 
Sub-Categories: 
6)  Participation in Elections 
7)  Respect for Civil and Political Rights 
Indicator Data: 
Free and Fair Executive Elections; 
Opposition Participation in Executive Elections; 
Free and Fair Legislative Elections; 
Opposition Participation in Legislative Elections; 
Respect for “Physical Integrity Rights”; 
Respect for Civil Rights; 
Press Freedom; 
Women’s Economic Rights; 
Women’s Political Rights; 
Women’s Social Rights; 
Women’s Rights. Necla Tschirgi 
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Category IV: Sustainable Economic Opportunity: 
Sub-Categories: 
8)  Wealth Creation 
9)  Macro-economic Stability and Financial Integrity 
10)  The Arteries of Commerce 
11)  Environmental Sensitivity 
Indicator Data: 
GDP per Capita; 
GDP per Capita Growth; 
Inflation; 
Deficits/Surplus as a Percent of GDP; 
Reliability of Financial Institutions; 
Number of Days to Start a Business; 





Environmental Performance Index. 
Category V: Human Development: 
Sub-Categories: 
12)  Poverty 
13)  Heath and Sanitation 
14)  Educational Opportunity 
Indicator Data: 
Poverty Rate at $1 per Person per Day; 
Poverty Rate at National Poverty Line; 
Primary Education; 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio, Primary; 
Progression to Secondary School; 
Ratio of Girls to Boys in School; 
Inequality (Gini Index): 




Immunization, Measles, DPT; 
HIV Prevalence; 
Incidence of Tuberculosis; 
Access to Health Care Workforce; 
Access to Drinking Water; 
Adult Literacy Rate. 
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